From mine to coast: transport infrastructure and the direction of trade in developing countries by Bonfatti, Roberto & Poelhekke, Steven
From mine to coast: transport infrastructure and the direction of
trade in developing countries
Roberto Bonfatti
University of Nottingham
Steven Poelhekke
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, and De Nederlandsche Bank ∗
January 13, 2017
Abstract
Mine-related transport infrastructure typically connects mines directly to the coast, a pat-
tern that is most clearly seen in Africa. We estimate the effect of such infrastructure on the
pattern of bilateral trade flows. We find that a standard deviation increase in the number of
mines over the mean biases a country’s pattern of trade flows in favor of overseas trade, to
the extent that these mining countries import 56% less from neighboring countries (relative
to overseas countries), than do countries with an average number of mines. However, this
effect is reversed for mining landlocked countries, who import relatively more from neighbors.
We rationalize this finding through the unequal effect that mines have on a country’s network
of infrastructure: because the mine-related transport infrastructure connects the coast rather
than neighboring countries, it lowers the cost of trading with overseas countries more than
with neighbors. In contrast, for landlocked countries trade costs are also lowered with some
neighbors through which infrastructure is built to reach the coast. The effect is specific to
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mines and not to oil and gas fields, because pipelines cannot be used to trade other commodi-
ties. The effect is robust to measuring the stock of mine-related infrastructure by distance
along roads between mines and ports, and to taking into account their relative position to
routes used for trade between ports and main cities. We discuss the welfare implications of
our results for development, and relate these to the recent surge of Chinese infrastructure
investment in Africa.
JEL Codes: F14, F54, Q32, R4.
Keywords: Mineral Resources, Transport Infrastructure, Regional Trade Integration, Grav-
ity Model, Economic Legacy of Colonialism.
1 Introduction
Mine-related transport infrastructure typically connects mines directly to the coast, at least in
countries where those mineral resources are mostly exported. But if mines are an important
determinant of total national investment in infrastructure, a resource-rich country may end up
with a transportation network with an interior-to-coast shape, potentially biasing its trade costs
in favour of overseas countries relative to neighboring countries. This pattern seems most relevant
in Africa. It has often been pointed out that African roads and railways have a markedly interior-
to-coast shape, which is historically rooted in the need to export natural resources. Figure
1 illustrates this. The figure presents a map of Africa’s best roads, which are also the main
arteries through which international trade is channeled.1 In many African countries, roads have
an interior-to-coast shape with relatively few links connecting neighboring countries. Many such
links seem to have been designed primarily to connect the interior of a landlocked country to the
coast. There is, however, some degree of variation: for example, resource-rich Guinea or Ghana
have a more interior-to-coast shape than Kenya, Tanzania or Namibia.2 In addition, resource-rich
and landlocked Zambia or Zimbabwe have many good links to the coast, whereas Uganda or the
Central African Republic have only one or none. This peculiar shape of African infrastructure is
1These are “main” or “asphalt” roads, as classified by Vmap0, the USGS National Imagery and Mapping
Agency, and the African Development Bank. A picture for railways looks very similar, however we prefer to focus
on roads because they are comparatively more important for contemporary African trade. Thirteen countries have
no railway at all, and many of the existing railways are in derelict state. In fact, 80% of non-mineral freight in Africa
is transported on Southern African lines (World Bank, 2010, p. 231). See also Jedwab and Moradi (forthcoming)
for the relative development of rail and road since colonial times.
2In the Online Appendix, we provide a case study of Ghana, a resource-rich country where the colonial transport
infrastructure had a clear interior-to-coast pattern, and has persisted to these days.
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likely to have influenced Africa’s relative trade costs: for example, Limao and Venables (2001)
find that poor transport infrastructure in Africa disproportionately penalises intra-African trade
(as opposed to trade between Africa and the rest of the world).
The peculiar shape of African infrastructure is often blamed on colonial policies, based on the
belief that colonisers cared too much about the colonies’ trade in natural resources as opposed to
their local and regional trade (e.g. Rodney, 1982, p. 209). They then invested only in the presence
of rich resource endowments and even then only in interior-to-coast networks. Africa’s interior-
to-coast networks are deemed to be ill-suited to promote its regional integration (Sachs et al.,
2004, p. 182), which in turn is often seen as a key step towards industrial development (Collier
and Venables, 2010). For this reason, the African Development Bank has been promoting an
ambitious plan to upgrade Africa’s interior-to-interior infrastructure: the overland connections
between the African countries (e.g. African Development Bank, 2003, p. 17).3
In this paper we test – and provide the first economic evidence in support of – the claim that,
in Africa, natural resource abundance is associated with interior-to-coast transportation networks
and thus with relative trade costs that favour overseas countries. In particular, we focus on mines
and mine-to-coast infrastructure, and test the following two hypotheses. First, African countries
export most of their mineral resources overseas, requiring transport infrastructure to connect the
mineral-rich regions to the coast. To the extent that such mine-to-coast infrastructure is also
usable to trade other goods it will reduce transport costs, and more so for trade with overseas
countries (which will always be routed through interior-to-coast connections) than for trade with
neighbors (which will, at least in some cases, be routed through cross-border connections, and
thus not benefit from the mine-to-coast infrastructure). Thus, our first hypothesis is that more
mine-related infrastructure should result in relative trade costs that favour overseas countries
over neighbors and in more trade with overseas countries relative to neighbors. Second, we
hypothesize that this effect should be weaker (or reversed) for landlocked countries, where the
mine-to-coast infrastructure will necessarily cut through some transit neighboring countries, and
thus also reduce the cost of trading with these.
We begin by estimating a gravity model of bilateral trade flows between African destina-
tions and worldwide origin countries in 2006 (controlling for importer and exporter fixed effects
3This was estimated to have the potential to increase overland trade by as much as $250 billion over 15 years
(Buys et al., 2010).
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and a range of standard measures of trade costs), distinguishing explicitly between coastal and
landlocked destinations. In our baseline specification we proxy for the amount of mine-related in-
frastructure with the number of mines in a country. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that,
in coastal countries, a higher number of mines results in less trade with neighboring countries
relative to overseas countries, to the extent that coastal countries with a number of mines one
standard deviation over the mean import 56% less from neighbors (relative to overseas countries),
than do countries with an average number of mines. However, this effect is reversed for land-
locked countries, where a higher number of mines results in more trade with neighbors relative
to overseas countries.
The differential trade effect of mines in coastal versus landlocked destinations leads us to
attribute this effect to mine-to-coast transport infrastructure, rather than other channels. Several
additional tests strengthen our conclusion. First, we use almost 80,000 online MapQuest queries
to identify the roads connecting each mine in each country to the coast and to the main container
port used for overseas trade, and the roads that connect each main city to the port. We use this
information to construct multiple alternative proxies to the number of mines for a country’s stock
of mine-related infrastructure. First, we measure actual mine-to-port infrastructure by summing
all mine-to-port road kilometers. Second, we allow for the possibility that mines do not use the
container port but a dedicated port if the mine is close to the coast and far from the port, by
summing the minimum of mine-to-port and mine-to-nearest-costal-point road kilometers. Third,
for the former measure, we first weigh each mine-to-port route by an index that captures the degree
of overlap between the mine-to-port route and all city-to-port routes before summing across mines
(the idea being that routes that overlap more should matter more for the overseas trade of the
cities). Finally, we do a version of the weighted mine-to-port sum of road kilometers where the
shortest route is measured in travel time with the aim of taking road quality into account. All of
these yield qualitatively the same asymmetric effect of mine-related infrastructure on the pattern
of trade.
Second, we conduct two independent falsification exercises. If mine-to-coast infrastructure is
what is driving the trade effect of mines, this effect should disappear when we look at specific
types of mineral resources that are unlikely to generate infrastructure usable to trade other goods.
We therefore add the number of oil and gas fields to our baseline specification, on the premise that
oil and gas, differently from other mineral resources, are mostly transported through pipelines.
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As expected, we find that mines have an asymmetric trade effect while oil and gas fields do
not. Furthermore, if mine-to-coast infrastructure is what benefits imports from overseas countries
(relative to imports from neighbors) this effect should also apply to imports from non-neighboring
African countries (relative to neighbors), which we find it does.
Finally, in further robustness tests we specifically identify trade between the landlocked coun-
tries and the coastal countries which they use as transit, instrument the number of mines with
discovered deposits, allow for selection bias in the trade data, and test our hypotheses for different
years as well as for exports. In all cases we find evidence in favor of our hypotheses. We also run
all our regressions for a larger sample of former colonies that includes non-African destinations
to show that the effect is not unique to Africa. We find no trade effect of mines in a sample of
non-former colonies. This may hint at a colonial legacy explanation for the trade effect of mines:
if colonisers only invested in resource-rich countries, and even then only in interior-to-coast net-
works, and if transportation networks persist over time, you would expect the trade effect of
mines to be stronger in former colonies.
Our findings shed lights on the link between natural resource endowments and Africa’s pecu-
liar interior-to-coast transportation networks as well as on the impact of such networks on relative
trade costs. However, they do not inform us on their impact on absolute trade costs, nor do we
know what the historical counterfactual to those networks would have been. We thus cannot
evaluate the welfare impact of such networks. Nonetheless, our results on relative trade costs
have important implications for development, which should be taken into account when plan-
ning future infrastructure investment. We make this point in relation to the different approach
that international development agencies and China seem to have taken to African infrastructure
investment in recent years.
The paper is related to a growing literature on the economic impact of transport infrastructure.
This has looked at the impact of infrastructure on the location of economic activity (e.g., Duranton
et al., 2014, for the US; Faber, 2014, for China), long-run economic growth (e.g. Banerjee et al.,
2012, for China), and market integration (e.g. Cosar and Demir, 2015, for Turkey; Donaldson,
forthcoming, for 19th-century India; Keller and Shiue, 2008, for 19th-century Germany).4 We
contribute to this literature by investigating the asymmetric market integration effect of natural
4Michaels (2008) uses the exogenous placement of transport infrastructure as an exogenous source of variation
in trade barriers in US counties, and study the effect on the demand for skilled labor.
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resource-related transport infrastructure across a large sample of countries.
The paper is also related to the literature on the economic legacy of colonial empires. Recent
contributions include Nunn (2008) on the long-run consequences of the slave trade on Africa;
Huillery (2009) on the long-run effects of public investment in colonial French Africa; and Iyer
(2010) on the comparative long-run impact of direct versus indirect colonial rule in India. We
contribute to this literature by looking at the cross-sectional (long-run) trade effect of investment
in mine-related transport infrastructure. Although Huilery (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2012)
also look at the long-run impact of infrastructure, we test for different hypotheses regarding the
impact of mine-related infrastructure on the pattern of international trade.5
Finally, the paper is related to the gravity literature on intra-African trade. Limao and
Venables (2001) find that, after controlling for standard determinants of trade costs, trade between
pairs of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries is lower than trade between pairs of non-SSA
countries. However, after controlling for a rough measure of the stock of national infrastructure
this difference becomes positive. They also find that the negative effect of distance on bilateral
trade flows is larger for SSA than for non-SSA pairs. We contribute to this literature by looking at
the causes of relatively poor infrastructure connecting the African countries.6 Finally, the paper
is related to the literature on the resource curse (see Van der Ploeg, 2011, for a recent survey),
which has presented various arguments why natural resource booms may not be a great source of
domestic growth for developing countries. Our results suggest that they may not be a great source
of growth for regional trading partners either, if they are accompanied by an infrastructure-driven
re-orientation of trade towards overseas countries (a possibility which we discuss in Section 6).7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalises the main hypotheses and embed
them in a standard gravity framework. Section 3 discusses data sources and the construction
5The idea that a country’s natural resource production may adversely bias national trade patterns dates back to
the so-called “Dependency School”(e.g. Dos Santos, 1970; Amin, 1972). The argument that transport infrastructure
played a key role in all this has been made, among others, by Rodney (1982), and Freund (1998). However, to the
best of our knowledge, no other paper has systematically tested this with data on mines.
6The effect of interior-to-coast transport infrastructure is conceptually similar to that of a reduction in tariffs
that is biased in favour of overseas countries. Thus, our paper is related to a literature that has sought to understand
whether the interests of developing countries are best served by North-South or South-South trade agreements.
For example, Venables (2003) finds that for a medium-income developing country, to sign a custom union with
developed countries may be less welfare-enhancing than to sign it with a low-income neighbor, while for the latter
the opposite is likely to be true.
7Because of these implications, the paper is related to the literature on international growth spillovers (e.g.
Easterly and Levine, 1998; Roberts and Deichmann, 2011), and particularly those papers that look at natural
resource booms explicitly (e.g. Venables, 2011).
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of variables. Section 4 and 5 present the results, and Section 6 discusses their implications and
concludes.
2 Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy
We begin this section by stating our two hypotheses, and we then explicitly motivate them and
operationalise them in the context of a gravity model of trade. Our hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1: in coastal countries, more mine-related transport infrastructure results
in less trade with neighboring countries, relative to trade with overseas countries.
Hypothesis 2: such an asymmetric effect of mine-related transport infrastructure is
weaker, or reversed, for the trade between landlocked countries and their trade part-
ners.
To motivate our hypothesis, we start from a standard gravity model specifying trade between
country o (“origin”) and d (“destination”) (see Head and Mayer, 2014, for an overview):
ln tradeod = k + α ln τ˜od + fo + fd + vod, (1)
where k is a constant, τ˜od is a measure of all trade costs incurred to trade between o and d, α is
a negative coefficient, fo and fd are origin and destination fixed effects, and vod is an error term.
A country can in principle enter both as an origin and as a destination. Our goal is to determine
how τ˜od depends on mine-related transport infrastructure in d, for all possible o.
8
Consider first a world with only coastal countries. This is represented in Figure 2, Panel I,
where a destination d imports from n origins, of which o1, ..., o5 lie on the same continent and
o6, ..., on are overseas. Overseas origins are connected to the destination through a sea route that
uses port P . Suppose a mine M exists in d. How will its transport infrastructure affect d’s cost
of importing from all o? Our argument proceeds in three steps.
First, because in developing countries mineral products are mostly exported overseas, M ’s
transport infrastructure is more likely to connect it to P , than to the borders with neighboring
o1, ..., o5. In the figure, this is represented by the thicker line connecting M to P . Second, the
8In our empirical analysis, we will also separately look at the effect of mine-related transport infrastructure in
o, for all possible d (see Table 8).
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infrastructure connecting M to P (from now onwards, the mine-to-coast infrastructure) will, in
many cases, also be usable to transport goods and will thus reduce the country’s overall trade
costs. However, since trade with o6, ..., on will always be routed through P , whereas trade with
o1, ..., o5 will at least in some cases be more cheaply routed via cross-border connections, the
mine-to-coast infrastructure is more likely to reduce the cost of trading with the former group of
countries than with the latter. Third, a given stock of mine-to-coast infrastructure may have a
stronger effect on transport costs in a small country than in a large one.9 In summary, we may
expect that coastal countries with more mine-related transport infrastructure per square kilometer
should on average face lower costs of trading with overseas countries, relative to neighbors.
Next consider a world in which there also exist landlocked countries (Figure 2, Panel II). Steps
1-3 are still valid to describe the effect of mine-related transport infrastructure on the cost of
trading with overseas countries relative to neighboring o1, o2 and o5. However, there are now two
neighbors of the landlocked destination (o3 and o4) with whom trade costs have also been reduced
by the mine-to-coast infrastructure that cuts through them. Landlocked destinations will always
use at least some of their neighbors as transit. We may then expect that the above-mentioned
effect of mine-related transport infrastructure should be weaker in landlocked destinations.
It is reasonable to assume that the more mines a country has the larger and of better quality its
stock of mine-related transport infrastructure will be.10 Therefore, we use the number of mines
per square kilometer in d, md/ad, as our main proxy for the stock of mine-related transport
infrastructure per square kilometer (we also construct alternative proxies which we propose in
Section 3.3).
Combining these arguments, we relate the mine-related transport infrastructure in a destina-
tion country to trade costs, τ˜od, as follows:
9For example, a 200 kilometer long mine-to-coast road in the Gambia will reach most of the country’s population,
while a similar road in Nigeria will only reach a small portion of the population.
10If mines are scattered throughout the national territory, more of them necessarily implies a larger stock of
mine-related infrastructure. If mines are concentrated in a region, more of them may not imply a larger stock, but
will still imply a better quality of mine-related infrastructure, since transport infrastructure must be strong enough
to withstand higher tonnages of goods traveling across them. In both cases, more mines imply a larger number of
trucks and carriages that reach the ports with mining products and that can be used to import goods on their way
back.
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ln τ˜od = −δNod − γ1ln md
ad
Nod − γ2 ln md
ad
(1−Nod) +
− ρLdNod − γ3ln md
ad
LdNod − γ4 ln md
ad
Ld (1−Nod) + ln τod, (2)
where τod is a vector of standard determinants of trade costs, Nod and Ld are, respectively,
neighbor and landlocked destination dummies, and δ, ρ, and γ1...γ4 are coefficients. We expect
0 < γ1 < γ2, but γ3 > γ4: the stock of mine-related transport infrastructure per square kilometer
- as proxied by the number of mines per square kilometer (md/ad) - should reduce the cost of
trading with overseas countries more than the cost of trading with neighbors, but this differential
effect should be weaker for landlocked destinations. In other words, it should be the case that
γ2 − γ1 > (γ2 + γ4)− (γ1 + γ3).
Having constructed an expression for the expected impact of mine-related transport infras-
tructure on trade costs (2) we can plug this back into our gravity equation (1) and re-arrange to
obtain our main regression equation:
ln impod =k + β1Nod + β2NodMd + β3NodLd + β4NodLdMd
+β5NodAd + β6NodLdAd + β7 ln τod + fo + fd + vod (3)
where Md ≡ lnmd and Ad ≡ ln ad.11 We have included all terms that in (2) do not depend
on bilateral variables in the destination fixed effect fd.
12 The first row contains our variables of
interests, while the second row are control variables. Our main coefficients of interest are β2 and
β4, where β2 = α (γ2 − γ1), and β4 = α (γ4 − γ3).13 We expect β2 < 0, β4 > 0, and possibly
β2 + β4 > 0: in coastal countries, more mine-related transport infrastructure (as proxied by the
number of mines, Md) should result in less trade with neighboring countries relative to trade with
overseas countries (β2 < 0), since the mine-related transport infrastructure biases relative trade
11We could have treated lnmd/ad as a single regressor, instead of breaking it into lnmd and ln ad. Indeed, results
are robust to using the former specification (see Table 6, column 2). However, we prefer the latter specification
because it is more flexible, and allows for an independent effect of area on trade with neighbors. For example,
larger countries could import more from neighbors simply because of longer borders. In the empirical analysis, we
measure Ad as deviation from average, so that Ad = 0 represents the case of a destination country with average
size.
12That is, the terms γ2 ln
md
ad
and γ4 ln
md
ad
Ld.
13The other coefficients can be written as follows: β1 = −αδ, β3 = −αρ, β5 = −α (γ2 − γ1), β6 = −α (γ4 − γ3)
and β7 = α.
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costs in favor of overseas countries. Such an asymmetric effect of mine-related infrastructure
should be weaker (β4 > 0), or reversed (β2 + β4 > 0), for the trade of landlocked countries with
their trade partners, since in this case the mine-related infrastructure will also reduce the cost of
trading with at least some neighbors. Note that β2 < 0 is the equivalent of Hypothesis 1, whereas
β4 > 0 (and possibly β2 + β4 > 0) is the equivalent of Hypothesis 2.
In our main analysis, we focus on Africa. If mines turn out to have an effect on relative
trade costs in that region, one possible explanation is that they do so partly because of a colonial
legacy: it might be that the colonisers disproportionately cared about the colonies’ trade in natural
resources as opposed to their local and regional trade. As a consequence, they only invested in
the presence of rich resource endowments and even then only in interior-to-coast networks.14,15
To investigate this, we split the world into two samples. The first sample comprises of countries
which (like Africa) were decolonised recently (after 1900). This includes all of the African colonies
plus a number of countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Central America (see Section 3.4 and
the Appendix for more details). The second sample comprises of all other countries. If colonial
legacy matters for the impact of mines on relative trade costs, we expect the impact of mines to
be stronger in the former sample than in the latter. We separately estimate equation (3) in the
two samples and compare results.
3 Data and Variable Definitions
To estimate the effect of mine-related transport infrastructure on trade we require data on bi-
lateral trade flows between as many countries as possible, a measure of mine-related transport
infrastructure, as well as variables that capture bilateral trade costs. The following subsections
discuss the source and construction of each variable. Summary statistics are provided in Tables
1-4.
14In unreported regressions we found that, in countries that were decolonised relatively recently but not elsewhere,
both in 1963 and in 2006 the number of mines is a predictor of kilometer of roads. These regressions controls for
population, per capita GDP and area.
15One might argue that, in comparison, a benevolent planner might have invested more in resource-poor countries
and in a more balanced network for resource-rich countries. Of course, we do not know that (absent colonialism)
the African countries would have been managed by benevolent planners. Even more importantly, we do not know
that such planners would have behaved any differently than colonisers, given the importance of the overseas natural
resource trade for the African economies and their scarce financial resources. These issues are further discussed in
Section 6.
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3.1 Trade
For trade, we rely on the UN Comtrade database which reports all known bilateral trade flows
in terms of value between countries in the world based on the nationality of the buyer and
seller.16 We measure the value of trade at the importing country and use the 2006 cross-section
which covers the highest number of countries in Comtrade (particularly for Africa). Even for
this recent year, we find that out of 49,506 (223 by 223-1) possible trade flows only 57% are
positive, while the other observations are coded as missing. Within Africa, there are 55 by 54
possible trade flows of which we observe 60%. After taking logs and conditioning on standard
control variables, our baseline regressions will be able to include around 6,000 observations where
the destination country is in Africa. As is typical with trade data, it is not certain whether the
missing observations are missing or if they are in truth zero flows, and they will be lost when
taking logs. This may introduce selection bias, but in robustness tests we show that our results
are robust to specifically allowing for zeros in trade flows and to using the smaller samples of
alternative years.
Tables 1 and 2 present summary statistics (the exact definition of “former colonies” is provided
in Section 3.4). Perhaps not surprisingly, landlocked countries tend to import relatively more from
neighbors. However, the bulk of imports into landlocked countries still comes from non-neighbors,
alleviating the concern that imports from the rest of the world may be re-labelled as imports from
the transit country, e.g. due to repackaging or accounting errors. Consistent with the view that
Africa is the least internally integrated region in the world, the African countries have the lowest
share of imports originating from neighbors. Finally, the African countries tend to import mostly
manufactures from non-neighbors, and to export natural resources (defined as goods other than
manufactures). In contrast, imports and exports of manufactures stand at about half of total
imports and exports to and from neighbors. These findings are supportive of the view that
African manufactures are not very competitive in global trade, but may be competitive in local
and regional trade.
16SITC Rev. 2, downloaded on Oct 30th, 2009.
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3.2 Mines as a measure of mine-related infrastructure
Ideally, a measure of mine-related transport infrastructure should take into account not only the
amount of infrastructure, but also its location and quality. However, although data exists on
the amount, shape and quality of transport infrastructure, it is hard to know what portions of a
network were built to serve the mines, as opposed to general transportation purposes. For this
reason, we take a simpler approach and use the number of mines in a destination country (Md)
as our main proxy for that country’s mine-related transport infrastructure. As explained in the
previous section (see in particular footnote 10), this measure should be a good proxy for the
amount and quality of mine-related transport infrastructure in a country. In the next section, we
describe various ways in which we refine our main proxy to take into account the actual transport
infrastructure connecting the mines to the coast, as well as its location and quality.
The US Geological Survey’s Mineral Resources Data System (MRDS)17 gives us both the
number and the location of active mines. The full database contains 305,832 records, but after
extensive cleaning we are left with 20,900 mines.18 Within this selection of mines 66% are located
in the US, whereas the remaining 7,122 mines cover 129 countries. Of these, 2,382 are in former
colonies and 497 in Africa. Although Africa is rich in mineral deposits relatively few have been
exploited. Some countries appear to have no mines. Based on the notion that the existence of
subsoil assets - and therefore mines - depends mostly on geology (which is essentially random), we
add one unit to the count variable of the number of mines before taking logs, to prevent selection
on a sample with only non-zero mines. The second rationale for doing this is that it is unlikely
that any country truly has no mine at all, while it is probably due to random measurement error
that some mines do not appear in the MRDS data. For example, a total of 18 African countries
are reported to have no mines, but 9 of these report exports of ores and metals in 2006.19 In
Section 4.2 we show that this does not affect our main results.
17Edition 20090205. Source: http://tin.er.usgs.gov/mrds/.
18Our empirical strategy requires that we focus on mines that were active in 2006 (or ceased activity not too
long before then, since for these the mine-related infrastructure will still be in place), and for whom we know
the location. We thus drop the following records: OPER TYPE is processing plant or offshore; PROD SIZE is
missing, small, none or undetermined; WORK TYPE is water or unknown; YR LST PRD was before 1960; DEV
STAT is prospect, plant, occurrence, or unknown; SITE NAME is unnamed or unknown; and mines for which the
coordinates fall outside their country’s mainland. Finally, we drop diamond mines, on the promise that diamonds
might be flown out rather than transported through roads.
19The remaining 9 include small island states and known smaller mineral exporters such as Chad (natron) and
the Central African Republic (gold).
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Table 3 presents summary statistics. Landlocked countries tend to have fewer mines than
coastal countries, both in absolute terms and per square kilometer. However, in Africa the
difference in the absolute number of mines is much smaller, and it is actually reversed for the
number of mines per square kilometer.
3.3 Alternative proxies based on the road network
We construct four additional proxies that capture to what extent a country’s network of transport
infrastructure is influenced by mining. These are the sum of mine-to-port road kilometers, the
sum of the minimum of mine-to-port and mine-to-nearest-coastal-point road kilometers, and two
proxies that weigh each mine according to its position relative to the main cities: one based on
road kilometers and one based on travel time. This section explains and motivates each proxy.
First, we obtain from MapQuest’s online routing server the route of the shortest road connect-
ing each mine Mj to the country’s main container port P (which will be the main port of entry
for the country’s seaborn trade). This is achieved by sending pairs of coordinates to MapQuest’s
online routing server which returns the route and the distance. We elaborate on the details of
these procedures in the Appendix.20 The location of the country’s main container port (point P )
is derived from the “World Port Ranking 2009” provided by the American Association of Port
Authorities (AAPA) and Maersk’s website, to track the port used by Maersk Line - the world’s
leading container shipping company - to import a container from Baltimore (or Shanghai) into
the country’s capital. This source also gives us the waypoint cities and transit country used
for trade by landlocked countries. We then sum across all mines in a country and take logs,
ln
(∑
jMjP + 1
)
.21 This first alternative proxy captures the idea that exporting minerals from
a mine requires the construction or improvement of a road that connects it to the a port. In the
same spirit as our main proxy, it may count the same road more than once if more mines use it,
to reflect the fact that the road will be of better quality. Unlike our main proxy, it additionally
takes into account the actual amount of infrastructure connecting mines to the port by giving
mines that are connected via a longer road (and thus potentially reach more of the country’s
20One could be tempted to use railways to measure distances, but a database of railways provided by Vmap0
(www.mapability.com) shows that 86% of rail kilometers in Africa connect to roads, while the remaining 14% have
a road within 1 kilometer at the median. Moreover, railways tend to be in poor shape and are not likely to be the
main mode of transport for trade (World Bank, 2010).
21For all road based measures we add 1 before taking logs.
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population) a higher weight.
Second, we also use MapQuest to find the shortest route connecting each mine Mj to the
nearest coastal point (point Sj) for which we rely on the “Global Self-consistent, Hierarchical,
High-resolution Shoreline Database” (GSHHSD) provided by the National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA).22 For each mine we then find the minimum of MjP and MjSj
and sum across all mines in a country and take logs, ln
(∑
j min (MjP,MjSj) + 1
)
.23 This second
alternative proxy captures the idea that mines that are close to the coastline and far from the
main container port may well use dedicated ports rather than the main container port, a situation
that adds relatively less infrastructure that can be used for general seaborn trade.
Third, we construct a mine impact index to capture the extent to which the mine-related
infrastructure is close to routes more frequently used to trade with overseas countries (as opposed
to neighboring countries). The basic idea is that mine-to-coast roads that are closer to those
routes will affect relative trade costs more, compared to more remote roads: we will then weigh
each mine-to-coast road by this measure. We now briefly summarise how the index is constructed:
a full explanation is provided in the Appendix. Per each mine Mj and city Ci, and given the
country’s main container port P , the index measures the extent to which the connection MjP
used by the mine overlaps with the connection CiP used by the city primarily to trade with
overseas countries.24 The index takes values between zero and one for each (Mj , Ci) combination,
where a higher value denotes a greater overlap. In addition, a correction term gives a lower
value of the index to mines that are better connected to the nearest coastal point Sj than to P ,
in acknowledgment of the fact that those mines might not use P at all. Having calculated an
index per each (Mj , Ci) combination, we average across population-weighted cities to obtain a
mine-specific index Ij .
25 To alleviate the concern that some cities might have emerged because
of (and along) the mine-to-coast infrastructure, we weigh cities by 1950 population.26
Figure 4 provides an example based on actual data points. For each of four African countries,
22http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/shorelines/gshhs.html
23For landlocked destinations, both Sj and P will be located in a different country.
24We postulate that Ci’s trade with overseas countries will more frequently use connection CiP than its trade
with neighboring countries based on the logic that (unlike trade with overseas countries) trade with neighboring
countries may also use cross-border overland connections to reach Ci.
25That is, we implicitly assume that the share of national imports each route represents is proportional to the
population size of the city.
26Results are robust to using current (2005) population. The location and population of each country’s main
cities is taken from the UN’s “World Urbanization Prospects” database of urban agglomerations with at least
750,000 inhabitants in 2010, to which we add hand collected city coordinates.
14
the figure reports the location of mines, main cities and the main container port, as well as the
mines’ average value of the index.27 In the top pair of countries (Mozambique and Egypt), mines
receive, on average, a low value of the index (0.10 and 0.17 respectively), whereas in the bottom
pair (Cameroon and Ghana) they receive a high value (0.98 and 0.60). That is because the
mines in the former pair are located faraway from city-port corridors. Furthermore, MapQuest
reveals that roads are in place (which are not shown in the figure) that quickly connect the
mines to the nearest coastal point, without overlapping with city-port corridors. In contrast,
mines in Cameroon and Ghana are located close to city-port corridors and their mine-to-coast
infrastructure overlaps substantially with such corridors. Our hypothesis is that the average mine
in Cameroon and Ghana should decrease the relative cost of trading with overseas countries more
than its counterpart in Egypt and Mozambique.
Having calculated the mine-specific index Ij , we now weigh each distance MjP by Ij , before
summing across mines and taking logs to obtain our third alternative proxy of mine-to-coast
infrastructure, ln
(∑
j IjMjP + 1
)
. Relative to our first alternative proxy, our second and third
alternative proxies additionally take into account the location of the mine-related transport in-
frastructure.
Finally, the fourth alternative proxy follows the methodology of the third but uses travel
time rather than kilometers as a unit of distance to calculate the shortest routes and is denoted
as ln
(∑
j I
time
j MjP
time + 1
)
. This final alternative proxy additionally attempts to measure the
quality of the mine-related transport infrastructure more directly.
3.4 Control variables
We always control for a broad set of standard determinants of trade costs, taken from Head et al.
(2010).28 These are ln distance, the natural log of distance between countries; Shared language,
a dummy equal to one if both countries share a language; Shared legal, a dummy equal to one if
both countries share the same legal origin; ColHist, a dummy equal to one if both trading partners
were once or are still (as of 2006) in a colonial relationship; RTA, a dummy equal to one if both
27For illustrative purposes only, we have reported the closest coastal point to the midpoint of mines, and not the
various mine-specific Sj that we use in the computation of the index.
28The data in Head et al. (2010) stop in 2006. When running regressions for 2007 and 2008 in our robustness
section, we use the Regional Trade Agreements Database from Egger and Larch (2008) to update the RTA variable
and Wikipedia searches to update Both WTO, Shared currency and ACP.
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trading partners belong to a regional trade agreement; Both WTO, a dummy equal to one if both
are members of the WTO; Shared currency, a dummy equal to one if they share a currency; and
ACP, which is a dummy equal to one for trade between EC/EU countries and members of the
‘Asia−Caribbean−Pacific’ preferential tariff agreement for former European colonies.
In addition, we construct controls for Shared emp, one colonizer and Shared emp, none colo-
nizer, which are dummies equal to one if the both trading partners were once part of the same
empire, and, respectively, one of the two or neither or them was the coloniser. We interact each
of these two variables with the neighbor dummy. These interactions control for the possibility
that colonisers built especially good infrastructure connecting them to a neighboring colony, or
connecting two neighboring colonies. The Linder variable is the absolute difference in GDP per
capita between trade partners and captures the idea due to Linder (1961) that countries with sim-
ilar GDP per capita tend to trade more intensively with each other, because the overlap between
their production and consumption goods is larger.29 It could be that countries with mines and
higher natural resource export revenues start importing more sophisticated products through an
asymmetric income effect on consumption. On average, such goods will be produced in countries
that are not neighbors, or at least from the perspective of many African countries. The Linder
variable is included to control for this possibility.
To construct the empire dummies and to be able to split the World sample of countries into
former colonies and non-former colonies, we need to define former colonies. We start from the
definition by Head et al. (2010) who consider a former colony a country that was colonized and
obtained independence after 1900. This seems an appropriate definition for our purposes since we
do not expect colonial investment to still matter in countries that became independent too long
ago (such as the USA). We further refine the definition by Head et al. (2010) by excluding those
countries that were only colonized by a neighbor since we do not expect colonial infrastructure
to have an interior-to-coast shape in those cases.30
29We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this control variable.
30For robustness, we have run all our specifications using both the broader Head et al. (2010) definition, as well
as a third, even narrower definition. See the Appendix for further details.
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4 Baseline results
In this section, we report our estimates of equation (3). Our main coefficients of interest are
β2 and β4. Based on Hypothesis 1, we expect β2 < 0: in coastal countries, more mine-related
transport infrastructure (as proxied by the number of mines, Md) should result in less trade with
neighboring countries relative to trade with overseas countries. Based on Hypothesis 2, we expect
β4 > 0: in landlocked countries, such an asymmetric effect of mine-related transport infrastructure
should be weaker. In addition, if β2 + β4 is found to be not significantly different from zero (or
positive), the effect of mine-related transport infrastructure disappears in landlocked countries
(or is reversed). To investigate the latter point, we always report at the bottom of tables marginal
effects of Md on trade with neighboring countries by landlocked status (this is equivalent to β2
for Ld = 0, to β2 + β4 for Ld = 1). In addition, by taking the marginal effect to Nod we may also
find that the border effect for coastal mining countries is negative. These effects are unlikely to
be due to potential (asymmetric) income effects from mineral extraction (e.g., African countries
with more mines consuming a larger number of sophisticated goods produced overseas) because
we always control for the Linder variable.31 The raw data in Tables 1 and 3 show that regions
with more mines tend to import more (which is probably an income effect) and that landlocked
countries import a higher share from neighbors. Our regressions will uncover if the share of
imports from neighbors is decreasing in the number of mines for coastal countries, but less so for
landlocked countries.
4.1 The trade effect of mines
Table 5 reports results for each of three samples. The first column focuses on African destina-
tions and the next two columns split the world into destinations that were former colonies and
destinations that were never colonies or have gained independence before 1900. Note that we
define former colonies as countries that were colonised by an overseas power, which excludes for
example members of the former Soviet Union. The trade effect of mines should be more visible
in Africa and in former colonies thus defined. The transport infrastructure of these countries will
be more heavily shaped by colonial transport infrastructure, which in turn was mostly designed
to export natural resources.
31To further rule out this alternative channel, we conduct two falsification exercises in Section 5.
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We find the usual determinants of trade: it decreases in distance and increases in country-
pair characteristics that make trade easier such as a common language, legal origin, a former
colonial relationship, membership of regional trade agreement and the WTO, sharing a currency
(although it changes sign for non-former colonies) and membership of Asia-Caribbean-Pacific
(ACP) treatment of imports into the European Union.32 Distance and a shared colonial history
matter more for African destinations. Finally, the Linder hypothesis is most apparent among
African destinations and former colonies.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are strongly confirmed in the case of African destinations. We find that
more mine-related transport infrastructure (as proxied by the number of mines) changes the
pattern of trade flows of coastal countries in favor of overseas countries (β2 < 0). This effect is
large: coastal countries with a number of mines one standard deviation over the mean (about
equal to a doubling) import 56% less from neighboring countries (relative to non-neighbors), than
do countries with an average number of mines.33 The effect is weaker for landlocked countries
(β4 > 0): in fact, we find that the effect of mines is reversed (β2 + β4 > 0). Again, the effect
is large: landlocked countries with a number of mines one standard deviation over the mean
import 58% more from neighboring countries (relative to non-neighbors).34 Here we treat all
neighbors as potential transit countries and do not assume that each country has one specific
transit route. Further down, in Section 5, we attempt to identify specific transit countries. For
example, Uganda’s main transport infrastructure crosses Kenya to reach the sea: but then these
should decrease the cost of importing from Kenya, and also from overseas countries.
When we split the sample in former colony destinations and non-former colonies (columns 2
and 3 of Table 5, we find that Hypothesis 1 and 2 are only confirmed in the case of former colonies:
only they import relatively less from neighbors if they have more mines (β2 < 0); moreover, only
32All African destinations are members of ACP.
33Using Tables 4 and 5: −56% = 1.29/1.35 ∗ −0.587.
34Using Tables 4 and 5: 58% = 1.29/1.35 ∗ 0.606. The effect of mines on landlocked countries may seem large,
but this can easily be rationalized. First, the infrastructure connecting the landlocked country to a transit neighbor
improves 100% of the route, whereas it only improves a small percentage of the route connecting the landlocked
country to overseas countries. Second and third, the mine-to-coast infrastructure also improves the domestic
infrastructure of the transit country (whereas it does not affect the domestic infrastructure of overseas countries),
and it does so in a very specific way (along the route that heads for the landlocked country). The latter two factors
are likely to be particularly important in the case of Africa, where transportation infrastructure is, in general,
extremely poor.
Finally, we experimented with adding interactions with the number of mines in the trade partner country (the
terms NodMo, NodLo and NodLoMo), although these should not correlate systematically with the number of mines
in the destination country. These estimates of our main effects are significant, while not significantly different from
those in Table 5.
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in former colonies, this effect is weaker for landlocked countries (β4 > 0), to the point that it
disappears (β2 + β4 not significantly different from zero).
35 These results may indicate a link
between the trade effect of mine-related transport infrastructure and colonial legacy: if colonisers
only invested in resource-rich countries, and even then only in interior-to-coast networks, you
would expect the trade effect of mines to be stronger in countries where colonial policies were
active until more recently.36 Note that coefficients are larger for the African sample than for the
broader former colonies sample: this squares well with our prior that, in Africa, mines were an
especially important determinant of total national investment in infrastructure (see Section 1).
Is it still the case that countries that share a border trade relatively more with each other
(∂ln(bilateral trade)/∂Nod > 0)? The coefficient, its variance, and the covariance between NodMd
and Nod (or NodLdMd and NodLd for landlocked countries) determine a range of Md for which the
African countries do not import significantly more from neighbors (relative to non-neighbors).
Figure 3 summarizes this relationship. The figure plots the marginal effect of being neighbors on
trade as a function of the number of mines in the destination country, by landlocked status, for
a country of average size in terms of land area (Ad = 0). As we increase the number of mines,
the marginal effect of Nod in coastal countries decreases, to the point that a country of average
size with more than 14 mines (= exp(2.7)) trades significantly less with neighbors than with
non-neighbors. In contrast, the marginal effect of Nod increases for landlocked countries and all
landlocked countries trade significantly more with neighbors than with non-neighbors.
Because trade flows are bilateral, an equivalent interpretation of our results is that if a country
has many mines, its neighbors export less to it relative to overseas countries, than if it had fewer
mines. In other words, a country’s mining boom does not imply that this country will spend
as much of the extra income on its neighbors’ exports (relative to other countries’ exports), as
one might have expected at pre-existing trade costs: it will actually spend less than that. This
effect is likely to persist for a long time, given that once the boom is over, the infrastructure
35Results for the non-former colonies sample are unaffected by removing the US, which as explained above is an
outlier for its very large number of mines.
36Alternative explanations for these findings are that, compared to non-former colonies, former colonies are
countries for which the overseas natural resource trade is more important, or countries that face weaker financial
constraints. Indeed, our sample of non-former colonies includes OECD countries with good connections to all
neighbors and trade partners. The marginal mine does not influence their infrastructure much, even if the country
is landlocked (such as Austria and Switzerland). Note however that result column 1 are robust to dropping OECD
countries from the sample of non-former colonies (the remaining countries including most of Latin America and
Central Asia).
19
will have changed in a way that benefits overseas countries relatively more. Without investment
in more cross-border infrastructure mining does not promote exports originating in neighboring
countries, or the emergence of local value chains, as much as would be possible with a more
balanced infrastructure.
So far, we have proxied for the mine-related transport infrastructure using the number of
mines. Since it is not easy to imagine many reasons - other than mine-to-coast infrastructure
- why mines should reduce relative imports from neighbors in coastal destinations (β2 < 0),
but much less so when the destination country is landlocked (β4 > 0), these results provide
suggestive evidence in favor of our hypotheses. We next turn to alternative measures of mine-
related transport infrastructure.
4.2 Alternative measures of mine-to-coast infrastructure
In this section we present results based on alternative measures of mine-related transport in-
frastructure and show that our results are highly robust. We begin by considering alternative
ways in which our main proxy for mine-related infrastructure (the number of mines) may enter
the regression, and we will then consider the four alternative proxies discussed in Section 3.3.
We focus in the rest of the paper on the African sample only. The Online Appendix reports all
regressions for the broader sample of former colonies, and results are qualitatively very similar.
The first set of results is reported in Table 6, columns 1-5. We suppress the control variables
from now on, although they are always included, and focus on the interaction variables of interest.
For comparison, column 1 repeats the baseline result for the Africa sample. In column 2 we do
not control for an interaction with land area separately, and measure Md as the log of the number
of mines per (million) square kilometers (that is to say, the term ln (md/ad) in eq. 2 is entered as
a single regressor).37 Because we do not add one to countries with no mines, we loose one-third
of the observations. Even for this smaller sample we still find a negative marginal effect of mines
in coastal countries on relative trade with neighbors. The positive marginal effect of mines in
landlocked countries is now not significantly different from zero. The third column treats Md as a
count variable that includes zero values and scales by area (md/ad entered as a single regressor),
while column 4 does not scale by area and includes separate area interactions instead (md and ad
37The controls are the same used in Table 5, except that in columns 2 and 3, the area interactions are not
included.
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entered separately). We still find the same pattern. In column 4, each additional mine reduces
the relative trade with neighbors by 1.9% for coastal countries. Landlocked countries import 5.1%
more from neighbors (relative to non-neighbors) with each additional mine. Although our results
are robust to using these alternative measures, we prefer to take logs in our main analysis, in
keeping with the log-linear gravity model and to allow for a more realistic concavity in the effect
of mines on infrastructure.
In columns 5-8 of Table 6, we turn to our alternative proxies of mine-related infrastructure. In
column 5 we measure infrastructure more directly by summing the kilometers along actual roads
that connect each mine to the port (
∑
jMjP ). The summation captures the idea that even if
two mines use one road, we expect the road to be of better quality. For example, heavier traffic
requires stronger roads and bridges and mines which require a longer road should have a bigger
effects on relative trade costs.38 The results are overall very stable but more nuanced: a standard
deviation increase in mine-to-port road kilometers in coastal countries reduces relative trade with
neighbors by 15.4%, and increases it by 11.4% for landlocked countries.39
Thus far we have implicitly assumed that all mine-related infrastructure overlaps in the same
way with city-port corridors, the route used by consumers to trade with overseas countries. This
is not necessarily true for mines that export through dedicated ports, for example when they are
located close to the coast but far away from the country’s main container port. Column 6 therefore
measures Md as the sum of the minimum distance along roads of the mine to the port and the mine
to the closest point on the coast (
∑
j min (MjSj ,MjP )). The result is nevertheless very similar
to column 5. Next, we turn to the mine impact index Ij . This provides a more accurate measure
of the extent to which each mine-to-coast road should affect relative trade costs. Furthermore, it
provides us with an exogenous source of variation: if exploration efforts do not differ much within
a country then the location of mines is determined by exogenous geology; in turn, this implies
that the necessary infrastructure is also placed exogenously, which helps us identify the impact of
mine-to-coast infrastructure on trade. The result is presented in column 7, where distances are
measured in terms of kilometers along actual roads (
∑
j IjMjP ) and in column 8 where distances
38The partial correlation between Md defined as the log of the number of mines and the log of the sum of mine-
to-coast road kilometer (controlling for GDP per capita, area, and landlockedness) is 81% and a simple regression
(not shown) suggests that a doubling of the number of mines leads to 90% more mine-to-coast road kilometer.
We additionally tried to scale by the distance between the origin and destination country, but we find that this
does not change the conclusion.
39Using Tables 4 and 6: −15.4% = 4.02/5.48 ∗ −0.210 and 11.4% = 4.02/5.48 ∗ 0.156.
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are based on travel time (
∑
j I
time
j MjP
time). The sign of the coefficients is unchanged, which
underscores the robustness of this finding. In terms of magnitudes, a standard deviation increase
in index-weighted mine-to-port road kilometers in coastal countries reduces relative trade with
neighbors by 14.4%, and increases it by 11.6% for landlocked countries. For travel time, the
effects are -8.4% and +7.5%, respectively. The difference in magnitude suggests that marginal
roads are of relatively poor quality which take more travel time and reduce trade costs by less
than is suggested by simple road kilometers alone. Nevertheless, this magnitude is economically
meaningful and similar to a 4.7% increase in distance between trade partners,40 or more than
half the effect of a shared legal origin, everything else equal.
Overall, Table 6 presents consistent evidence in favor of our hypotheses. Mine-related trans-
port infrastructure, measured in a number of different ways, decreases trade costs in an asym-
metric way: trade costs between coastal countries and the rest of the world decline relative to
trade costs with neighbors, but this effect disappears or is even reversed for landlocked countries.
The former result could provide an explanation for relatively limited intra-African trade.
5 Additional results and robustness
In Table 7 we perform additional tests of the robustness and causality of our main finding. For
comparison, column 1 again presents the baseline results using the number of mines as a proxy
for mine-to-coast infrastructure.
Transit country. Column 2 allows for a specific relationships between landlocked countries
and their transit neighbor. We have so far been agnostic about which neighboring country of a
landlocked country is the transit country, since this may depend on the type of trade and may
be endogenous to the number of mines. We now use major rail connections and data from the
Maersk container shipping line to find for each landlocked destination the waypoints and transit
port used. We then define a dummy TLd which is equal to one if the destination is landlocked
and the origin is used for transit by the landlocked country.41 Column 2 replaces the landlocked
404.7%=8.4%/1.785, where the latter coefficient is taken from Table 5.
41More in detail, we follow a two-step procedure to construct the dummy TLd. First, we enquire with Maersk
Line (http://www.maerskline.com) about the route they use to send a container from Baltimore (or Shanghai) to
the landlocked country’s capital. This yields the African port of call, and thus the transit neighbor used by Maersk.
We then set TLd = 1 for imports of a landlocked country from that particular neighbor. Second, using data on
African railways (from Wikipedia) we also set TLd = 1 for imports of a landlocked country from neighbors to which
it is connected through a railway. This procedure yields the following results (in parenthesis are transit countries):
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dummy Ld with the dummy TLd. In terms of significance and magnitude the result is quite
similar and robust to this exercise.42
Oil & gas fields. A natural falsification exercise is to investigate whether oil and gas fields
have a similar trade effect to that of mines. While the asymmetric income effect (e.g., African
countries with more mines consuming a larger number of sophisticated goods produced overseas),
as well as yet another alternative channel whereby African countries with more mines import more
mining machinery from overseas, should be at play for oil and gas fields as well, the infrastructure
channel should not. The infrastructure channel relies on the assumption that the mine-to-coast
infrastructure can be used not only to export minerals but also to trade a broad set of commodities.
But while metals and other non-hydrocarbon minerals are mostly transported through roads and
railways, oil and gas are mostly transported through pipelines. Clearly, the former may also be
used for trade, while the latter cannot.43 Thus, if the trade effect is due to those alternative
channels, it should be there for both mines and oil and gas fields. If it is due to mine-to-coast
infrastructure it should be there for mines only. We therefore extend the baseline regression with
a measure of oil and gas fields. We use data from Horn (2003), who reports 878 on- and offshore
oil and gas fields with a minimum pre-extraction size of 500 million barrels of oil equivalent
including year of discovery from 1868-2003, geographic coordinates and field size measures. This
data set builds on previous data sets (e.g. Halbouty et al. 1970) and attempts to include every
giant oilfield discovered around the world. Oil, condensate and gas are summed, with a factor of
1/.006 applied to convert gas trillion cubic feet to oil equivalent million barrels. We define OGd
as the log of the number of fields plus one, similarly as we did for mines.
Results are reported in column 3 of Table 7. Note that we control for all control variables
including the Linder variable, which captures the absolute difference in GDP per capita between
Botswana (South Africa, Zimbabwe); Burkina Faso (Ivory Coast); Burundi (Tanzania); CAR (Cameroon); Chad
(Cameroon); Ethiopia (Djibouti); Lesotho (South Africa); Malawi (Mozabique); Mali (Senegal); Niger (Benin);
Rwanda (Tanzania); Swaziland (South Africa); Uganda (Kenya); Zambia (Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe);
Zimbabwe (Botswana, Mozambique).
42One might have expected that the marginal effect of mines on the landlocked countries’ relative trade with
neighbors should be higher when we single out transit neighbours, compared to when we treat all neighbors the
same. Note however that our procedure to identify transit countries may well label as non-transit some neighbors
that are transit in reality. In addition, landlocked countries with more mines tend to have more transits according
to our definition. If the marginal effect of Md on total trade with transit countries (relative to non-transit) is
decreasing, we would be biasing our coefficient downwards by calculating its average effect over a larger number of
transits in countries with higher Md. Because of this endogeneity in the number of transit countries, we prefer to
look at the average effect across all neighbors (whose number is presumably exogenous) in the main analysis.
43Pipelines may have an effect through the construction of maintenance and access roads, but we expect this to
be small.
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countries and should capture any asymmetric income effect that leads to more imports from
overseas markets. We do not find an effect of oil and gas fields and it does not explain away
the negative interaction of mines.44 Note that none of the landlocked African countries has
major oil & gas fields. In the Online Appendix we show that the same results hold for a larger
sample of former colonies where the latter interaction can be included. The fact that mines
remain significant but oil and gas fields do not, is strong additional evidence in support of the
infrastructure hypothesis, and against the alternative channels described above.
IV deposits. In column 4 of Table 7 we instrument for the number of mines using data on the
number of known mineral deposits. Proprietary data acquired from Minex Consulting provides
the number of known mineral deposits in each country in Africa, as of today. We use this as an
instrument for the number of mines that have been or are active since 1960. We assume that
exploration up to today, conditional on current income per capita and landlocked status, has only
randomly delivered deposits because underground geology is exogenous. The number of deposits
predicts the current number of mines well (given the high F-test), but not perfectly. This is
because some deposits were never developed and some large ones resulted in more than one mine.
The net effect is a coefficient below one.45 The main pattern is robust to this IV strategy: coastal
countries with more mines import relatively less from neighbors, and this effect is weaker (to the
point that it disappears) for landlocked countries.
Same continent. A second falsification test further helps to rule out alternative channels. If our
results were driven by the fact that African countries with more mines spend more on sophisticated
goods or mining machinery produced in developed countries, then those African countries should
be importing relatively less not only from neighbors, but also from non-neighboring African
countries (since the latter typically do not produce those sophisticated goods or machinery).
Instead, if our results were driven by infrastructure, those non-neighbouring African countries
should not be relatively penalised, since they also benefit from the mine-to-coast infrastructure.46
44Since the data on oil and gas fields also includes the field’s pre-extraction size in millions of barrels of oil
equivalent, we also experimented with redefining OGd as the log of one plus the volume of reserves in the country.
This led to qualitatively identical results. However, pre-extraction field size is probably only a rough measure of
current field size.
45First stage of [4] is a cross-country regression of Md on (with coefficient between brackets and standard errors
between square brackets) the log of the number of deposits (0.856*** [0.100], landlocked status (-0.403 [0.253]),
and log GDP per capita (0.228*** [0.081]), using 45 observations and giving an R2 of 0.646.
46In other words, in the alternative story, relative to an African country with fewer mines, Ghana should not only
be importing less from Ivory Coast relative to Germany, but also from Mozambique relative to Germany. In our
story, instead, Mozambique should not be penalised relative to Germany, since Ghana’s mine-to-coast infrastructure
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Therefore, we add to the baseline specification interactions with a dummy equal to 1 if the
origin country of the bilateral trade flow is from the same continent as the destination country
(Continentod).
The result is given in column 5 of Table 7. We still find that coastal countries with more
mines import relatively less from neighbors, and the opposite for landlocked countries: this is
now relative to non African countries, and can be seen by summing the coefficients on NodMd
and ContinentodMd for coastal, and NodLdMd and ContinentodLdMd for landlocked (these sums,
−0.544∗ and 0.630∗∗, are reported at the bottom of the table). The coefficients on ContinentodMd
and ContinentodLdMd provide the marginal effect of mines on imports from non-neighbouring
African countries, relative to imports from non-African countries, for coastal and landlocked
country respectively. As expected, both coefficients are non-negative. In fact, the first coefficient
is even positive and significant, suggesting for coastal countries a positive asymmetric effect of
mine-related transport infrastructure on imports from non-neighboring African countries, relative
to imports from non-neighboring non-African countries. This differential effect of mines could
be due to the fact that the former group of countries will on average be closer to an African
destination: the mine-to-coast infrastructure will then improve a larger proportion of the route
used by traders.
Exports. We next turn to analysing exports. Multiple uses of infrastructure may mean that
the mine-related transport infrastructure may be used for non-resource exports as well. If that is
the case we should find that coastal countries with more mines export relatively less to neighbors.
For landlocked countries, this effect should be weaker, since trade costs for exports have declined
towards the neighboring (transit) markets. To test this, we replaceMd, Ld and Ad with their origin
counterparts Mo, Lo and Ao, so that we are now looking at exports. Furthermore, we change the
dependent variable to three measures of trade: total trade, trade net of ores and metal exports,
and trade net of all natural resources (incl. agricultural natural resources), or manufacturing.
Results are presented in Table 8. We find a negative coefficient on relative exports to neighbors,
although it is insignificant, and for landlocked countries we find a significant increase in relative
exports to neighbors. The former insignificant effect could be due to the fact that the mine-
to-coast infrastructure connects coastal countries to countries that are strong in manufactured
should in principle benefit both in the same way. (In contrast, at least some of the imports from Ivory Coast will
not benefit: those that are more cheap to carry overland even after the mine-to-coast infrastructure has been built).
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goods, such as China: import competition may then drown the positive trade cost effect. This is
plausible given the effects on imports.
Robustness. Up to now we implicitly assumed that the intensive margin of trade (how much is
traded) and the extensive margin of trade (whether there is trade) were independently determined.
In this section we relax that assumption and allow for zero trade flows explicitly.
We start by specifying a Poisson model that treats trade as a count variable following Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006). Column 1 shows the result of this maximum likelihood estimation
and shows that our main results hold. In column 2 we use the same estimator but change
the definition of Md to the index weighted sum of mine to port road kilometers. The result is
still robust and compared to Table 6 the coefficients are more similar between the two proxies.
Alternatively, we perform a Heckman 2-step sample selection estimator (Heckman, 1979) which
allows for different coefficients to determine the extensive margin of trade. Column 3 is a probit
regression of a dummy equal to one if trade is positive on all right hand side variables and an
excluded instrument. We follow Helpman et al. (2008) and use an indicator of whether the
number of procedures and days to start a business is above median in both the origin and the
destination country as a measure of the fixed costs of engaging in trade.47 This variable is
significant and predicts that trade is less likely. Column 4 is the second step and includes the
Mills ratio to correct for any sample selection. We still find relatively less trade with neighbors
for coastal mining countries and relatively more for landlocked mining countries.
Next we allow for correlated errors between all origins of the same destination (column 5) or
both between all origins of the same destination and all destinations of the same origin (column 6)
which uses the procedure of Cameron et al. (2011). The standard errors are only marginally larger
than in the baseline case with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (which in our setting is
identical to clustering on each country-pair). This suggest that any remaining correlation in the
errors is low, that our regressors capture almost all of the shocks, and that any heteroscedasticity
does not bias the standard errors. We therefore favor robust standard errors, because multi-way
clustering produces a more variable estimate of the covariance matrix and because multi-way
clustering tends to over-reject the null when the number of clusters is small (Cameron and Miller,
2015).
47Data from the World Bank Development Indicators 2012. The variables are: time required to start a business
(days) (IC.REG.PROC) and start-up procedures to register a business (number) (IC.REG.DURS), which come
from the Doing Business project (Djankov et al., 2002).
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In Table 10 we show that choosing the year 2006 does not drive our results. We selected this
year because it has the largest number of observations for Africa which improves efficiency. In
fact, the results for coastal countries are more significant and of higher magnitude in 2004, 2005
and 2007. The landlocked marginal effect of mines is positive in all years and more significant in
2007 and 2008.
6 Conclusions
Coastal African countries with more mines import less from neighbors, relative to overseas coun-
tries, which confirms our first hypothesis. In contrast, landlocked African countries with more
mines import relatively more from neighbors, which confirms our second hypothesis. Our tests
suggest that this is due to mine-to-coast transport infrastructure, which reduces the relative cost
of trading with overseas countries more than with neighbors. Our findings shed light on the
link between natural resource endowments and Africa’s peculiar interior-to-coast transportation
networks, as well as on the trade consequences of such networks. The above-mentioned pattern
can also be detected in a broader sample of recently decolonised countries, but it is not present
in other countries. This last finding is consistent with (though not a proof of) the view that
colonial transport networks - which are likely to have a greater influence on the shape of recently
decolonised countries - were designed primarily to export natural resources, and still have an
influence on the way in which former colonies trade today.
Two caveats must be made. First, our results only inform us about relative trade costs. We
cannot rule out that the mine-to-coast infrastructure reduces absolute trade costs vis-a-vis both
neighbors and overseas countries, thus increasing trade with both. Second, we do not know what
the counterfactual to the mine-to-coast infrastructure would have been. It is plausible that, had
those resource-rich countries had fewer mineral resources and thus less mine-to-coast transport
infrastructure, they would have had less transport infrastructure overall, and thus perhaps higher
average trade costs vis-a-vis all countries. Similarly, it is plausible that, had those countries not
been colonised, they might have had less transport infrastructure overall; or, perhaps, they might
have developed the exact same transport infrastructure (for example, if one believes that this
infrastructure is optimal).
Still, our results have important implications for the redistributive and competitive effects of
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resource-related infrastructural investment. A mining boom in an African country may naturally
be expected to generate positive spillovers on other countries by generating greater demand for
their products (see, for example, Venables, 2011). However, if the boom is associated with a
change in relative costs that favours overseas countries (which according to our results will be
the case for coastal booming countries), fewer of these spillovers will benefit neighboring African
countries than one may otherwise have expected. Another implication is that firms located
in neighboring countries who do not benefit from the mine-to-coast infrastructure (for example,
because they trade more cheaply through other routes), will, as a result of that infrastructure, face
higher trade costs relative to their overseas competitors. This effect may also apply to domestic
firms, if their location is such that they do not benefit from the mine-to-coast infrastructure
directly. Firms may well exit because of excessive competition, which in turn depends on relative
(and not absolute) costs. By affecting relative trade costs, the mine-to-coast infrastructure may
then have a negative competitive effect on regional and domestic producers.48
These effects should be kept in mind when evaluating the impact of infrastructural investment
in Africa. In this respect, it is interesting to consider the recent surge of Chinese investment
in Africa, particularly in comparison with the investment strategy advocated by development
agencies such as the African Development Bank (ADB). For years, the ADB has been advocating
a major expansion in Africa’s transport infrastructure, a large chunk of which should consist of
long-distance, intra-African (interior-to-interior) connections (e.g. ADB, 2003, p. 17). On the
other hand, the lion’s share of recent investment has been taken up by China and its state-owned
construction companies. Do these Chinese investments help achieve the expansion path advocated
by the ADB? To get a sense of this, we collected data (available in the Online Appendix) on the
trajectory of the 40 largest Chinese road and rail investment projects between 2000 and 2013. We
found that only 5 of these 40 projects connected two African countries with each other, and in
4 out of 5 cases this involved the connection of a landlocked country to the coast. Furthermore,
83% (by value) of the projects have an interior-to-coast shape, in the sense that they are primarily
designed to connect the interior of a country to the coast. To a first (and admittedly superficial)
look the Chinese investments seem more oriented towards reinforcing Africa’s interior-to-coast
transport network then to achieve the more balanced expansion path advocated by the ADB.
48In a similar vein, Venables (2003) showed that the interests of a middle-income country may best be served by
reducing trade costs vis-a-vis a neighboring low-income country, rather than decreasing them vis-a-vis an overseas
developed country.
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While one cannot underestimate the importance of the Chinese roads and railways for the African
countries, results in this paper suggest that their potential redistributive and competitive effects
should also be taken into account.
Ideally, the debate on Africa’s infrastructural development should be based on an answer to
the following question: would Africa be better off by improving its internal connectivity, and thus
favour the expansion of its regional trade, or would it be better off by improving its interior-
to-coast connections, and thus favour its trade with the wider world? Unfortunately, there is
no easy answer to this question. For example, suppose we took the view that Africa has the
largest trade opportunities with the wider world because of a comparative advantage in natural
resources, but that some of its manufacturing industries are also quite competitive in local and
regional trade. From a static comparative advantage perspective, it would make a lot of sense
to expand the interior-to-coast connections that support Africa’s main trade. However, such an
investment may well backfire from a dynamic perspective, since it may lead to Africa specialising
away from manufacturing, which is where sustained economic growth is typically generated (e.g.,
Grossman and Helpmann, 1991). This example suggests that an answer to this question can only
be given in the context of a properly estimated model of infrastructural investment, trade and
growth. We think this is a challenging but fascinating avenue for future research.
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Figure 1: African main and asphalt roads, 2002. Source: ‘Vmap0’ from (www.mapability.com)
and African Development Bank (www.infrastructureafrica.org), prepared for World Bank
(2010).
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Table 1: Average imports by region
Country mean of: Imports
(USD mln)
% imports
from neigh-
bors
Imports
(USD mln)
% imports
from neigh-
bors
Region Not landlocked Landlocked
non-former colonies 4,413 23.21 927 44.93
former colonies 597 14.42 277 30.17
Africa 540 10.43 203 25.71
Note: the table shows country means by region and landlocked status for ln imports, and for the percentage of
total imports originating in neighboring countries.
Table 2: Average trade patterns, Africa versus Rest of the World
Country mean of: Share of manufactures in imports from Share of manufactures in exports to
Region All Neighbors Non-neighbors All Neighbors Non-neighbors
Africa 0.73 0.56 0.74 0.36 0.48 0.35
Rest of the World 0.74 0.67 0.77 0.61 0.60 0.64
Note: the table shows country means by region for the share of manufactures in the average bilateral trade flow,
average bilateral trade flow with neighbors, and average bilateral trade flow with non-neighbors. Manufactures are
defined as all trade minus SITC divisions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 68.
Table 3: Average mines by region
Country mean of: md md/ad md md/ad
Region Not landlocked Landlocked
non-former colonies 376.41 1.99 15.02 0.27
former colonies 17.95 13.48 5.91 0.29
Africa 10.56 0.15 5.67 0.23
Note: md and ad equal, respectively, the number of mines in each country, and country area expressed in 10
4 sq.
km. The table shows country means by region and landlocked status for the number of mines, and the number of
mines per 104 sq. km. The mean of md/ad is large for coastal former colonies because of Nauru and other island
states. The number of mines in coastal non-former colonies is large due to the large number of mines in the United
States. Without the United States this value for md is 93.74 and md/ad = 1.73.
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Table 4: Summary statistics, Africa sample
Variable N mean median sd min max
ln bilateral trade 6,026 13.08 13.29 3.86 0.69 22.87
Nod 6,026 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.00 1.00
Md: ln № mines +1, destination 6,026 1.35 1.39 1.29 0.00 5.49
Ad 6,026 1.50 2.04 2.01 -4.72 3.90
Ld 6,026 0.27 0.00 0.44 0.00 1.00
Linder 6,026 0.37 0.64 1.11 -7.95 1.85
Nod∗ Shared empire, one colonizer 6,026 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
Nod∗ Shared empire, none colonizer 6,026 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 1.00
Ln distance 6,026 8.57 8.67 0.70 4.88 9.87
Shared language 6,026 0.25 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.00
Shared legal origin 6,026 0.41 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
ColHist 6,026 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.00 1.00
RTA 6,026 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00
Both WTO 6,026 0.68 1.00 0.47 0.00 1.00
Shared currency 6,026 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.00
ACP 6,026 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ln № Mines per 106 square km 4,219 2.50 2.61 1.34 -0.23 5.29
№ Mines per 106 square km 6,026 19.96 3.74 38.42 0 197.56
№ Mines 6,026 12.62 3 41.53 0 241
ln(
∑
jMjP + 1) 6,026 5.48 7.32 4.02 0.00 12.07
ln(
∑
jmin(MjSj ,MjP ) + 1) 6,026 5.03 6.58 3.87 0.00 11.80
ln(
∑
j IjMjP + 1) 6,026 5.22 6.50 3.66 0.00 11.66
ln(
∑
j I
time
j MjP
time + 1) 6,026 8.05 10.64 5.41 0.00 15.46
ln oil & gas fields 6,026 0.47 0.00 0.93 0.00 3.40
ln deposits 45 3.13 3.14 1.07 0.69 6.23
ln total exports 5,808 12.36 12.28 3.96 0.69 24.09
ln non ores & metals exports 5,756 12.26 12.18 3.93 0.00 24.09
ln non-resource exports 5,077 11.36 11.21 3.74 0.00 22.77
Procedures and days above median 9,833 0.35 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Nod = neighbor dummy; Ad = ln land area, deviation from world average; Ld = landlocked destination dummy;
MjP = distance along roads from mine j to port in kilometer; MjSj = distance along roads from mine j to
coast; MjP
time = distance along roads from mine j to port in travel time; Ij = mine j impact index based on
distance; Itimej = mine j impact index based on travel time.
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Table 5: Local mining and relative trade with neighbors: baseline
ln(bilateral trade)
[1] [2] [3]
Sample, destination equals: Africa former colonies non-former colonies
Nod 0.269 0.143 0.507*
(0.648) (0.400) (0.287)
NodMd -0.587* -0.431** -0.028
(0.314) (0.191) (0.104)
NodLd 2.240*** 1.094** -0.434
(0.831) (0.504) (0.398)
NodLdMd 1.193*** 0.715** -0.175
(0.397) (0.301) (0.196)
Linder -0.083** -0.089*** 0.069***
(0.039) (0.019) (0.024)
NodAd 0.592*** 0.389*** -0.041
(0.215) (0.133) (0.120)
NodLdAd -0.718** -0.113 0.880***
(0.308) (0.195) (0.291)
Nod∗ Shared empire, none colonizer -0.671* 0.041 1.262***
(0.405) (0.291) (0.383)
Nod∗ Shared empire, one colonizer -0.695 -0.389 -1.249***
(0.945) (0.695) (0.369)
ln distance -1.785*** -1.682*** -1.333***
(0.089) (0.035) (0.046)
Shared language 0.781*** 0.801*** 0.538***
(0.099) (0.066) (0.110)
Shared legal origin 0.136* 0.225*** 0.578***
(0.080) (0.046) (0.059)
ColHist 1.349*** 1.081*** 0.895***
(0.244) (0.155) (0.150)
RTA 0.366*** 0.650*** 0.492***
(0.142) (0.082) (0.084)
Both WTO -0.254 0.401** 0.118
(0.242) (0.156) (0.202)
Shared currency 1.139*** 0.966*** -0.718***
(0.273) (0.199) (0.144)
ACP - -0.238 0.827***
(0.240) (0.114)
Destination and origin FE yes yes yes
Observations 6,026 14,911 9,134
R-squared 0.685 0.704 0.782
Marginal effect of Md on ln imports from neighbors for Ad = 0
If Ld = 0 -0.587* -0.431** -0.028
If Ld = 1 0.606** 0.284 -0.204
Note: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of mining in both landlocked and coastal destination
countries on relative trade with neighboring countries. Variables 2-4 and 6-9 are interactions: Nod = neighbor
dummy; Md = mines in the destination country (in ln+1); Ad = ln land area, deviation from world average; Ld
= landlocked destination dummy; Linder = absolute difference in per capita GDP; ColHist = 1 for pair ever in
colonial relationship. Origin and destination fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses: ***
p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. The non-former colonies, former colonies and Africa samples refer to all bilateral
trade flows in which the destinations country is: not a former colony; a former colony; in Africa, respectively.
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Table 7: Local mining and relative trade with neighbors, Africa sample: transit neighbors,
placebo test, IV and same-continent interactions
Dependent variable: log(bilateral trade)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Baseline transit oil&gas IV deposits same continent
Nod 0.269 1.256** 0.318 0.764 0.307
(0.648) (0.557) (0.651) (0.817) (0.651)
NodMd -0.587* -0.466* -0.673** -0.975** -0.706**
(0.314) (0.268) (0.332) (0.403) (0.319)
NodLd 2.240*** 2.205*** 2.068** 2.277***
(0.831) (0.834) (0.964) (0.835)
NodLdMd 1.193*** 1.281*** 1.255** 1.248***
(0.397) (0.411) (0.527) (0.411)
NodTLd 1.197
(1.149)
NodTLdMd 1.018***
(0.336)
NodOGd -0.283
(0.255)
Same continent dummy (Continentod) 1.298*
(0.733)
ContinentodMd 0.162**
(0.070)
ContinentodLdMd -0.073
(0.139)
Control variables included yes yes yes yes yes
Destination and origin FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 6,026 6,026 6,026 5,365 6,026
R-squared 0.685 0.684 0.685 0.697 0.686
Kleibergen-Paap F-test 72.888
Marginal effect of Md on ln imports from neighbors for Ad = 0
If Ld = 0 -0.587* -0.673** -0.975**
If Ld = 1 0.606** 0.608** 0.280
If TLd = 0 -0.466*
If TLd = 1 0.551**
If Continentod = 0 & Ld = 0 -0.706**
If Continentod = 1 & Ld = 0 -0.544*
If Continentod = 0 & Ld = 1 0.541*
If Continentod = 1 & Ld = 1 0.630**
Note: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of mining in both landlocked and coastal destination
countries on relative trade with neighboring countries. All except Nod and control variables are interactions: Nod
= neighbor dummy; Md = a measure of mines in the destination country (in ln+1); Ad = ln land area, deviation
from world average; Ld = landlocked destination dummy; TLd = 1 if landlocked destination imports from its
transit origin. Origin and destination fixed effects are included, and so are the controls listed in Table 5. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1. Sample: all bilateral trade flows in which
the destinations country is in Africa. First stage of [4] is a cross-country regression of Md on (with coefficient
between brackets and standard errors between square brackets) the log of the number of deposits (0.856*** [0.100],
landlocked status (-0.403 [0.253]), and log GDP per capita (0.228*** [0.081]), using 45 observations and giving an
R2 of 0.646.
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Table 8: Local mining and relative trade with neighbors, Africa sample: exports
Dependent variable equals (log of) Total exports Non ores and metal exports Manufacturing exports
[1] [2] [3]
Nod 1.168* 1.217* 1.044
(0.665) (0.676) (0.759)
NodMo -0.194 -0.174 -0.067
(0.178) (0.179) (0.202)
NodLo -2.116*** -2.280*** -1.544**
(0.674) (0.685) (0.755)
NodLoMo 1.387*** 1.453*** 1.100***
(0.336) (0.333) (0.362)
Destination and origin FE yes yes yes
Observations 5,808 5,756 5,077
R-squared 0.610 0.608 0.600
Marginal effect of Mo on ln imports from neighbors for Ao = 0
If Lo = 0 -0.194 -0.174 -0.067
If Lo = 1 1.193*** 1.279*** 1.033***
Note: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of mining in both landlocked and coastal destination
countries on relative trade with neighboring countries. Variables 2-4 are interactions: Nod = neighbor dummy;
Mo = a measure of mines in the origin country; Ao = ln land area, deviation from world average; Lo = landlocked
origin dummy. Origin and destination fixed effects are included, and so are the controls listed in Table 5. Robust
standard errors in parentheses: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1, + p= 0.106. Sample: all bilateral trade flows
in which the origin country is in Africa. “Non ores and metals exports” equals total exports minus SITC divisions
27, 28, and 68. “Manufacturing exports” equals total exports minus SITC divisions 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 68.
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Table 10: Robustness tests, Africa sample: different years
Dependent variable: log(bilateral trade)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Year: 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Nod 1.880*** 1.051* 0.269 1.342** 1.303**
(0.593) (0.593) (0.648) (0.601) (0.584)
NodMd -0.922*** -0.788*** -0.587* -0.819** −0.585+
(0.310) (0.290) (0.314) (0.362) (0.362)
NodLd 0.924 2.064*** 2.240*** 1.616** 1.312
(0.720) (0.709) (0.831) (0.710) (0.940)
NodLdMd 1.056*** 1.231*** 1.193*** 1.339*** 1.118***
(0.349) (0.376) (0.397) (0.411) (0.394)
Control variables included yes yes yes yes yes
Destination and origin FE yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,433 5,452 6,026 5,619 5,663
R-squared 0.681 0.692 0.685 0.697 0.689
Marginal effect of Md on ln imports from neighbors for Ad = 0
If Ld = 0 -0.922*** -0.788*** -0.587* -0.819** −0.585+
If Ld = 1 0.134 0.443
+ 0.606** 0.520** 0.533**
Note: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of mining in both landlocked and coastal destination
countries on relative trade with neighboring countries. Variables 2-4 are interactions: Nod = neighbor dummy;
Md = a measure of mines in the destination country (in ln+1); Ad = ln land area, deviation from world average;
Ld = landlocked destination dummy. Origin and destination fixed effects are included, and so are the controls
listed in Table 5. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1,+ p= 0.12. Sample:
all bilateral trade flows in which the destinations country is in Africa.
44
A Appendix
A.1 Identification of points Sj and P and construction of the mine impact
index
The GSHHSD database49 used for points Sj provides the co-ordinates of all coastlines in the
world, and comes in four levels of detail (1 =land, 2 =lake, 3 =island in lake, 4 =pond in island
in lake) and five resolutions. For our purposes, it is best to use level 1, which excludes the
possibility that we find S on the shore of a lake, and a low resolution, which builds up the world’s
coastlines from 64, 000 coordinates.50
To identify point P , we proceed in several steps. First, we use the “World Port Ranking 2009”
provided by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) to infer the main container
port for all countries with at least one port included in the ranking. For countries that are not
included in the AAPA ranking, we use, when possible, Maersk’s website, to track the port used
by Maersk Line - the world’s leading container shipping company - to import a container from
Shanghai into the country’s capital.51 Finally, for countries that are neither included in the
AAPA ranking nor reached by Maersk Line, we identify the main commercial port by conducting
a series of internet searches.52 We coded as “port co-ordinates” those of the port’s nearest city,
which we got from the World Urbanization Prospects database, and, for smaller cities, from
Wikipedia/GeoHack.
We use MapQuest’s online digital maps to calculate distances and routes.53 Specifically,
we use MapQuest’s Directions Web Service (http://www.MapQuestapi.com/directions/). For
each pair of locations we send the coordinates to the server, which returns a route along roads as
a string of shapepoints (coordinates) and travel distance. We use the shapepoints of the city-port
route to find the point on this route that is closest to the mine in a straight line. We then use
49http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/mgg/shorelines/gshhs.html
50An intermediate level of detail would use 380, 000 coordinates, and quickly increase the time it takes to calculate
distances.
51Maersk Line has the largest market share (18%) according to http://www.shippingcontainertrader.com/facts.shtml.
52This led us to take Shanghai as the reference port for Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Mongolia, Poti for Turmenistan
and Uzbekistan, and St Petersburg for Kazakhstan.
53We chose MapQuest rather than for example Google Maps, because the former’s servers allowed access to
more routing requests per day. For the Africa and Colony sample we need to construct 13,463 individual indices,
requiring more than 5 routing requests each, while the MapQuest daily limit is 5,000. The large number of mines
and cities in non-colony countries requires several orders of magnitude additional routing requests. For example,
the US would require at least 5*56*14,090=3,945,200 requests for 56 cities and 14,090 mines, which would take
more than two years.
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that point to find a route and distance along roads from the mine to the city-port route.54
The index is constructed as follows. Consider mine Mj in destination country d. Take a city
Ci in this country, as well as the country’s main container port, P . We use MapQuest to find the
shortest route along roads connecting Ci to P , CiP . The city, port and shortest route connecting
them are represented in each of the four panels of Figure 5. For illustrative purposes we have
represented CiP (and other road connections to be discussed below) as a straight line but this
does not need to be the case in the data. We then construct an index measuring the extent to
which MjSj overlaps with CiP . Because P is the country’s main container port, we expect most
of the goods imported by Ci from overseas countries to be channeled through CiP . Our logic
is that the more MjSj overlaps with CiP - the higher is the index - the more the mine-to-coast
infrastructure will reduce the cost for the country to import from overseas countries.
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Figure 5: Construction of the mine impact index.
54In some cases the server could not calculate a route because the coordinates of the mine were in a remote
location with few roads nearby. In that case (private) access roads to the mine may not appear in the database. In
those cases we used the Google reverse geocoding service (https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/
geocoding/#ReverseGeocoding) to find the geographical name (of the nearest town one level above street name)
of the location of the mine. Using this name we retrieved new coordinates using Google’s geocoding service, which
were subsequently used to calculate a new route. To the resulting distance we add the straight line distance between
Mj and the new starting point of the route. If this method still did not yield a route, we instead use the straight-line
great circle distance. Mostly, this happened for distances MSj because Sj is not necessarily an inhabited location.
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Our proposed index for mine Mj , in relation to city Ci, is:
Iij = i
1
ij ∗ i2ij ∗ i3ij , (4)
where:
i1ij =

MjSj+1
MjP+1
if MjSj < MjP
1 if MjSj > MjP
(5)
i2ij =

MjP+1
MZj+ZjP+1
if ZjP < CiP
MjP+1
MCj+CiP+1
if ZjP > CiP
(6)
i3ij =

ZjP+1
CiP+1
if ZjP < CiP
1 if ZjP > CiP.
(7)
The mine impact index is the product of three distinct terms, all ranging between 0 and 1.55
The first term (i1ij) compares the length of MjSj to MjP and captures the probability that the
mine uses P to export. The term is high when Sj is close to P or when Sj is far from P but
MjSj still follows a large share of MjP . In that case Mj is naturally positioned to use P as a
shipping port. Figure 5 provides an example. The figure contains four panels, each representing
a mine, its mine-to-coast infrastructure (in blue) and the shortest route connecting the mine to P
(in red). The term i1ij is low (0.3) for mine M1 because this mine is located faraway from P and
close to the coast and is thus naturally positioned to use a dedicated port. Mine M2 however, is
also faraway from P , but the MapQuest query reveals that the actual route for this mine passes
through P ; there is apparently no road connecting Mj to Sj . The term i
1
ij is then high for mine
M2. Finally, i
1
ij is also high for mines M3 and M4 since Sj is close to P for both: they are both
naturally positioned to use P as a shipping port.
The second term (i2ij) compares the length of MjP to the length of the shortest route con-
necting Mj to P passing through point Zj : this term captures the probability that some part
of CiP is used by the mine. Zj is defined as the junction between CiP , and the perpendicular
coming from Mj . The term i
2
ij is high for a mine whose shortest connection to P is on the same
axis as C’s shortest connection to P . In Figure 5, mine M2 has a relatively low value of i
2
ij (0.6)
55The term i2j actually ranges between
√
2∗ZjP+1
2∗ZjP+1 and 1.
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while M3 and M4 have a high value (1): that is because M2 is located far from the axis of CiP ,
whereas M3 and M4 are located right on it.
The third term (i3ij) compares the length of ZjP to that of CiP . This term is high for a mine
whose shortest connection to P overlaps with a large share of CiP . In Figure 5, mines M3 and
M4 both have a high i
2
ij since they are both close to CiP . However i
3
ij is relatively low for M3
(0.7) while it is high for M4 (1), because M3 overlaps with only a portion of CiP whereas M4
overlaps with all of it.
The overall index is highest for mine M4 (1) and lowest for mine M1 (0.08). The route from
the mine to the coast of the former perfectly overlaps with CiP , whereas that of the latter does
not overlap with it at all.
In some cases we find that Ci very far from Pi, but also relatively close to a coast. For these
particular cities the main container port may not be the relevant one. Such a city may be supplied
through a smaller secondary port, which also means that the mine-city route has little impact on
the ability to import through the country’s main container port. This occurs for 73 out of 238
cities. Therefore, we multiply (4) by a fourth dummy term:
relevance of port =
 0 if CiP > Pcentroid ∧ CiScity < Pcentroid1 else. (8)
Where ‘centroid’ is the centroid of a country56, and Scity is a point on the coast nearest to
a city Ci. A weight of zero is given to individual city-mine indices, where (a) the straight-line
great-circle city-port distance is longer than the distance between the port and the centroid of
the country, and (b) the distance between the city and the coast is less than the distance between
the port and the centroid of the country.
A.2 Defining former colonies
Our favorite definition of former colony is Head et al. (2010)’, refined to exclude those countries
that were only colonized by a neighbor. To give an example, our definition excludes most of
the former Soviet republics (who were only colonized by the USSR), but not Namibia (who
56From http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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Table A.1: Non-African, non-island former colonies.
Asia America Europe
Afghanistan Kuwait Belize Albania
Armenia (Russia) Kyrgyzstan (Russia) Canada Bosnia & Herzegovina
AZERBAIJAN (Russia) Laos French Guiana BULGARIA (Turkey)
Bangladesh Lebanon Grenada Croatia (Austria)
BELARUS (Russia) Macao Guyana CZECH REPUBLIC (Austria)
Brunei Darussalam Malaysia Suriname Estonia
Cambodia Myanmar FINLAND (Russia, Sweden)
GEORGIA (Russia) Pakistan Gibraltar
Hong Kong Papua New Guinea IRELAND (Britain)
India Qatar LATVIA (Russia)
Indonesia Syria LITHUANIA (Russia)
Iraq Tajikistan (Russia)
Israel Turkmenistan Macedonia
Jordan UKRAINE (Russia) Moldova
MONGOLIA (China) United Arab Emirates POLAND (Germany)
North Korea Uzbekistan (Russia) Romania
South Korea Viet Nam SLOVAKIA (Austria)
KAZAKHSTAN (Russia) Yemen SLOVENIA (Austria)
Note: non-African, non island former colonies who obtained independence after 1900. “Non-islands” are countries
who share a land border with at least another country. In capital letter are countries whose colonizers were
all neighbors (reported in parenthesis). Underlined are countries that, even though their colonizers (reported in
parenthesis) where not all neighbors, can still be expected to have traded with all their colonizers mostly overland.
was colonized in different periods both by a neighbor, South Africa, and by a non-neighbor,
Germany). For robustness, we have run all our specifications using both the broader Head et al.
(2010) definition, as well as a third, even narrower definition. In the latter, we have excluded not
only countries who were only colonized by a neighbor, but also those who, despite being colonized
by a non-neighbor, can reasonably be expected to have traded with their colonizer overland (e.g.
Kyrgyzstan, who was colonized by the USSR). Table A.1 provides a full list of non-African, non-
island former colonies. All African countries except for Liberia and Ethiopia are in our preferred
definition of colonies. Our preferred definition of colony includes all countries whose name is in
lower case in Table A.1; the broader definition includes also countries whose name is in upper
case; and the narrower definition excludes countries whose names is underlined.
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